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Plato and Aristotle on the Instant of Change – A Dilemma 
John Bowin, University of California, Santa Cruz 
 
There is an ancient puzzle about motion in Plato at Parmenides 155e-157b which has been the subject of 
scholarship by Richard Sorabji and more recently, Nico Strobach.1 The puzzle, as Plato gives it, can be roughly 
summarized as follows: At every time, a given object must either be in motion or at rest; there is no third possibility. 
Also, an object can never be simultaneously both in motion and at rest. The only way for an object to be both in 
motion and at rest is for it to be in motion and at rest at different times. But how does a thing come to be in motion 
at one time and at rest at another? It cannot switch at a time when it is in motion. Nor can it switch at a time when it 
is at rest. This would seem to exhaust the possibilities for the times when the switch could occur. But a thing cannot 
change without changing. 
Plato asks, essentially, when and how an object switches between motion and rest. Aristotle takes up the 
puzzle in the sixth book of the Physics (Phys. 6.3, 234a34-b5), but he recasts it as a problem about what to call an 
instant separating a period of motion from a period of rest; i.e., shall we call it an instant of motion, an instant of 
rest, an instant of both motion and rest, or an instant of neither motion nor rest? Saying that the dividing instant is an 
instant of both motion and rest violates the law of non-contradiction, while saying that it is an instant of neither 
motion nor rest violates the law of the excluded middle. But saying that it is just an instant of motion or just an 
instant of rest seems arbitrary, since it bounds both the period of motion and the period of rest. 
Aristotle assumes that, if one allows motion or rest at an instant, then one must say that an instant dividing 
periods of motion and rest must be an instant of both motion and rest, since “it is the same instant that belongs to 
both the periods [of motion and of rest]” (Phys. 6.3, 234a34). Aristotle argues that, since the law of non-
contradiction is non-negotiable, we must reject the assumption that there can be motion or rest at an instant, and this, 
he implies, avoids violating the law of the excluded middle because “the motion of that which is in motion and the 
rest of that which is at rest must occupy [a period of] time” (Phys. 6.3, 234b8-9). Aristotle’s point seems to be that 
the law of the excluded middle does not apply to motion and rest at instants because they are not the sort of things to 
exist at instants — motion and rest are defined over periods of time. This allows him to solve the puzzle by saying 
that the instant dividing periods of motion and rest is an instant of neither motion nor rest, and that this is the case 
because all instants are instants of neither motion nor rest. 
It is important to note that while this solution may be fine as far as it goes, it does not constitute a complete 
answer to Plato’s puzzle, which inquires after the status of the instants dividing periods of motion and rest as well as 
what is involved in arriving at and departing from these instants. Now in Physics book 3, chapter 1, and book 5, 
chapter 2, and Metaphysics book K, chapter 12, Aristotle recognizes only four kinds of genuine or non-incidental 
changes, viz., change of quality, change of place, change of size, and generation and destruction,2 and in Physics 
book 6, chapter 6, he claims that each of these sorts of change is continuous.3 Since Aristotle commits himself to the 
view that local motion, as such, is continuous, in order to be consistent, he must describe the acceleration and 
deceleration involved in coming to and departing from a stand as continuous as well. And indeed, that is what he 
appears to do in Physics book 6, chapter 8, where he argues that there is no first time of coming to a stand. Aristotle 
argues that since there is no motion at an instant (234a24-b9; 237a14-15), times of motion must be periods of time 
(239a3-b4). Since times of motion are periods of time and periods of time are infinitely divisible, times of motion 
must also be infinitely divisible. Since times of coming to a stand are times of motion, times of coming to a stand 
must be infinitely divisible as well. Hence, if times of coming to a stand are infinitely divisible, there is no first time 
of coming to a stand. In other words, no matter how small an interval we pick at the start of a period of coming to a 
stand, there is always a smaller sub-interval within it that is earlier than the interval taken as a whole.  
By a similar argument, there should be no last moment of coming to a stand since no matter how small an 
interval we pick at the end of a period of coming to a stand, there is always a smaller sub-interval within it that is 
later than the interval taken as a whole. And if within any such sub-interval the moving body has a lower velocity 
than it does within the period of which it is a part, then Aristotle has succeeded in describing continuous coming to a 
stand. 
                                                
1 Richard Sorabji “Aristotle on the Instant of Change.” Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supplementary Volume 50 (1976). See 
also Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, 
pp. 403-421. Niko Strobach. The Moment of Change, A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and Time. Dortrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. 
2 Physics 3.1, 200b32-201a16, Physics 5.2, and Metaphysics Κ 12. 
3 Physics 6.6, 237a17-b3 and b9-21. 
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It is important to recognize just what Aristotle means when he proposes to divide a motion in this way. In 
Physics book 5, chapter 4 he claims that motions are actually divided by coming to a stand. Since Aristotle is 
dividing a period of coming to a stand in Physics book 6, chapter 8, we may safely assume that he proposes to divide 
the motion of coming to a stand potentially, but not actually. What this entails, it seems, is to regard the motion as 
though it were already completed, and then imagine, counterfactually, that it had been sub-divided by a series of 
pauses. And when we say that the motion of coming to a stand is infinitely divisible, what we imagine is not an 
actually infinite series of pauses, but a finite series of pauses that is infinitely extendable, i.e., that is potentially 
infinite. This is because a staccato motion, if we actually tried to undertake it, as well as the process of imagining it 
occurring, are infinitely extendable step-wise processes. This is apparently what Aristotle has in mind in his answer 
to Zeno’s dichotomy paradox, where he claims that the runner traverses an infinite number of half-distances 
potentially but not actually (Phys. 8.8, 263b6-7). We assume that the runner finishes the race, and then consider, 
counterfactually, the potentially infinite number of places and times that he might have stopped but, in fact, did not. 
I claim, however, that on Aristotle’s own principles, he is not entitled to assume that the motion of coming 
to a stand can be completed as a prelude to describing it in this way. Recall that Aristotle claims motion is only 
intelligible over periods of time. If this is the case, then he must conceive of coming to rest in terms a succession of 
periods in which a body is moving at slower and slower velocities. But since velocity may vary continuously, then 
no matter how slowly a body is moving, it can and must move even more slowly before it comes to rest. As a 
consequence, in order to come to rest, either a moving body must traverse the whole of an infinite sequence of 
periods with smaller and smaller velocities, or it must traverse a finite sequence of such periods and then transition 
to the period of zero velocity discontinuously. Now obviously, recognizing the traversal of an actually infinite series 
would be a very serious concession for Aristotle because it would violate one of his most basic philosophical 
commitments — a commitment that finite human minds are up to the task of understanding the universe, because the 
universe, in its essence, is a finite thing. In Aristotle’s view, our ability to understand the world amounts to our 
ability to comprehend substances or actualities, and we could not do this if the definitions of these things were 
infinitely complex (An. Post. 1.22, 82b37-9). So Aristotle would appear to have no choice but to recognize the 
discontinuous coming to be and passing away of motion. 
The obvious objection at this point would be to claim that my conclusion is not warranted because it is a 
potentially infinite sequence of periods with smaller and smaller velocities that is traversed, and Aristotle 
countenances the existence of potential infinities in Physics book 3 chapters 4-8, as well as their traversal in book 8 
chapter 8. There are, however, compelling reasons to reject this suggestion. Aristotle held that continua are 
ontologically and definitionally prior to their material parts, as an instance of the more general principle that a 
form/matter composite is ontologically and definitionally prior to its matter (Metaph. Z 1). In Physics book 4, 
chapter 9, Aristotle takes a continuous spatial magnitude, for instance, to be a bounded extension, or a form/matter 
composite consisting of a bounding surface (form) and a spatial extension (matter).4 And since kinetic and temporal 
continua are derived from spatial continua, a continuous motion will also stand to its parts as a form/matter 
composite to its matter.5 
A consequence of this is that one need not mention the segments of a motion to capture its non-accidental 
or formal attributes. Only the formal parts of a form/matter composite are salient for definition and understanding 
(Metaph. Z 10, 1035b31 ff.). This allows Aristotle to respond to Zeno’s dichotomy paradox by claiming that the 
runner traverses an infinite number of half-distances, but this does not prevent him from finishing the race, since the 
racecourse is only accidentally composed of these half-distances. In its essence and form, a race is just a simple 
traversal of a racecourse (263b6-7). 
Now prima facie, velocity and any variation in it would appear to be a non-accidental, formal attribute of a 
motion. And since Aristotle claims that the velocity of a motion is only intelligible over periods of time, then some 
segmentation of the motion must be presupposed in any account of its variations in velocity. If these variations in 
velocity are continuous, then an infinite number of segmentations must be presupposed. 
But even if one were to deny that variations in velocity are formal attributes of a motion, one cannot deny 
that its termini are. In Physics book 5, Aristotle tells us that motions are individuated by their termini and that they 
are terminated by coming to a stand. But surely, coming to a stand is just a special sort of variation in velocity, 
which, on Aristotle’s account, must be accounted for by a segmentation of the motion. And if the coming to a stand 
is continuous, then an infinite segmentation is required. Granted, the approach of Zeno’s runner to the finish line 
need not presuppose the traversal of an infinite sequence of sub-motions, but this is because it is not part of the 
                                                
4 See Phys. 4.9, 209b5. Aristotle identifies unbounded extension with matter at 209b9-10. 
5 See Physics 4.11. 
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puzzle that he comes to a stand at the end of the race. If one claims that he does come to a stand at the finish line, 
then an account should be forthcoming as to how he manages to do this. 
So again, Aristotle would appear to have no choice but to recognize the discontinuous coming to be and 
passing away of motion. Indeed, he seems to concede this consequence in Physics book 5, chapter 2 (225b33-a6). 
Here Aristotle claims that there is no process of coming to be (and presumably passing away) of motion, on the 
grounds that any “change of change and becoming of becoming” involves an infinite regress. Of course, acceleration 
is a “change of a change,” and a less than generous reading of this passage might take it to deny the existence of 
acceleration altogether, but I am inclined to think that it is only meant to deny acceleration from a stand, insofar as 
this is equivalent to the coming to be of a motion. Thus, we may speculate that Aristotle was aware that a 
discontinuous change in velocity at the beginning and the end of a motion was required on the assumption that the 
traversal of an actual infinity is impossible. 
There are two reasons why we might be disconcerted with discontinuous changes in velocity, but they 
would not have bothered Aristotle. First, from a modern perspective, i.e., one that assigns a sense to instantaneous 
velocity, discontinuous changes in velocity look paradoxical in that it appears as though the decelerating object has 
two velocities at once. This is not a problem for Aristotle since an object cannot have an instantaneous velocity. The 
second reason has to do with Newton’s Second Law of Motion, which effectively prohibits discontinuous changes in 
velocity by making force directly proportional to acceleration. If acceleration were infinite, then an infinite force 
would be required to cause it, but an infinite force is impossible. Aristotle does not have this problem, however, 
since in his discussion of dynamics in Physics book 7, chapter 5 he makes what we would call force (dunamis) 
directly proportional to velocity instead of acceleration (which makes his notion of dunamis in a local motion 
analogous to Newton’s definition of “quantity of motion”). For Aristotle, dunamis is needed to sustain as well as to 
initiate motion, and dunamis must be continuously applied as the object moves; more dunamis if the object is 
moving faster, less dunamis if it is moving slower. But with no concept of inertia, however, change in velocity will 
be as sudden as the application and the withdrawal of a dunamis. And, if the application of dunamis is as sudden as 
the coming in contact of the mover with the thing moved (see Cael. 1.11, 280b6-9), then, by this reasoning also, the 
change in velocity at the beginning and end of a motion will be instantaneous. 
In the light of the foregoing, one might be tempted to claim that for Aristotle, it is only the coming to be 
and passing away of motion that is discontinuous, and that local motion, once it exists, is invariably continuous. Or 
one might think that if there is a problem, it is a rather minor one that may be classed as an isolated exception to 
Aristotle’s theory. Indeed, Aristotle seems to allow a variety of exceptions to the rule that all genuine changes are 
continuous.6 At De sensu chapter 6, (446b28-447a6), Aristotle allows that some qualitative changes may, but are not 
required to occur all at once, as in the simultaneous freezing of all of the parts of a pond. And a few lines earlier 
(446a18-20), he admits the discontinuity of transitions between colors, tastes, and sounds, due to what he assumes is 
the limited number of discriminable colors, tastes, and sounds in existence. In Physics 7.5, he also allows 
discontinuity in the force needed to move an object, positing a threshold force, below which a motion will not occur 
(due to friction, presumably). The example given is ship-hauling, where if it takes 100 men to move a ship 100 feet, 
it does not follow that one man can move a ship one foot (250a15-19). Finally, in Metaphysics book Z, chapter 15, 
and book Η, chapters 3 and 5, he claims that substantial forms cannot come into or go out of existence piecemeal, 
since the unity of a substance is irreducible to the unity of any of its parts (1039b26; 1043b14; 1044b21). 
But dismissing, like this, the problem I have identified, overlooks the fact that it is perfectly generalizable 
to transitions between any two velocities. Suppose that a moving body traveling at 6 miles per hour decelerates to a 
velocity of 5 miles per hour. If the number of decelerations that the body undergoes is finite, how will the body 
ultimately decelerate to 5 miles per hour without undergoing a discontinuous change in velocity? No matter how 
close the velocity gets to 5 miles per hour (e.g., 5.1, 5.01, 5.001, 5.0001 m.p.h., etc.), if the number of decelerations 
is finite, then the ultimate deceleration to 5 miles per hour must be discontinuous. If passing to and from a period of 
zero velocity is discontinuous because Aristotle cannot account for how a continuous transition between motion to 
rest ultimately takes place, so too must the passage to and from any period with some positive velocity. If this is so, 
then non-uniform motions will not only discontinuous at their beginnings and endings, but throughout. 
This, I think, highlights a basic shortcoming of Aristotle’s concept of motion. The idea that motion is 
simply the traversal from place A at time t to place B at time t + 1 makes it impossible for Aristotle to conceive of 
continuous changes in velocity. For Aristotle, the velocity associated with the traversal of an object between spatial 
                                                
6 Changes that fall outside of the category of genuine change may be discontinuous as well, e.g., relational changes. Things may 
stand or fail to stand in relations to other things, but there is no process of coming to stand in a relation, or coming not to stand in 
a relation (Phys. 225b11-13; 246b11-12; 247b4). But what is at issue in Plato’s puzzle is the genuine change of local motion. 
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termini is always a non-instantaneous velocity, and a non-instantaneous velocity always masks the variation in the 
velocity over the period of change. Aristotle can divide the motion up as finely as he likes, but unless he embraces 
the concept of instantaneous velocity, there will always be jumps or drops in velocity as the object moves from one 
motion subsegment to the next. 
 
